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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16522

DANIEL ALLEN TEMPLE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with two felonies--Possession
of a Stolen Motor Vehicle in violation of § 41-1-112, Utah
Code Ann.,
§

(1953, as amended), and Theft in violation of

76-6-404, Utah Code Ann.,

pleaded not guilty (R. 10).

(1953, as amended), to which

he

He was later charged with the

Class A misdemeanor offense of Attempted Possession of a
Stolen Motor Vehicle, to which appellant pleaded guilty
(R._ 8,

:?1).
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was sentenced by Judge David B. Dee
on May 23, 1979, in the Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to a term of 11 months,
such term "to run consecutively with the present sentence
and concurrently with the sentence of Judge Gowans"

(R. 28),

who had so sentenced appellant on May 2, 1979 for Failure
to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, also a Class A
misdemeanor (R. 38 and Appellant's Brief at p. 1).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respo~dent

seeks affirmation of the judgments and

sentence of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Inasmuch as this appeal is limited to a review of
a court's consecutive sentencing power, and inasmuch as
appellant

pleaded guilty to the offense charged in the

information, no transcript was made of the proceedings and
thus this sketchy statement of facts is derived solely
from the trial court's record.
On January 28, 1979, a motor vehicle was stolen
from the Budget Rent-A-Car parking lot.

On or about Februa0

1, 1979, appellant was observed driving a 1979 Mercury
automobile, serial number 9Z6~F618790, in an unlawful manner
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and committed a traffic violation (R. 5, 7).

salt Lake

county Sheriff deputies pursued the appellant and a
collision resulted at 950 East North Union Boulevard
(R.

5, 7).

A search of Budge Rent-A-Car's records revealed

that the car stolen from its lot on January 28 was the car in
appellant's possession on February 1, 1979.
Appellant was originally charged with two felonies-Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, in violation of Utah
Code Ann., § 41-1-112

(1953, as amended), a third-degree

felony, and Theft, in violation of § 76-6-404, Utah Code
Ann.,

(1953, as amended), a second-degree felony (R. 5, 7),

to both of which appellant pleaded

not guilty (R. 10).

After a sequence of "plea bargaining" meetings,
the State agreed to reduce the charges to a single offense
of Attempted Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, which
reduced the third-degree offense to a Class A misdemeanor
(see § 76-4-102 (4), Utah Code Ann.,

(1953, as amended)).

On May 23, 1979, the appellant entered his written
and signed guilty plea to Judge David B. Dee and was sentenced
"consecutively with the present sentence and concurrently
with the sentence of Judge Gowans"

(R. 28).

Appellant's

present sentence was an undescribed felony conviction which
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appellant was serving for ten years
to November 30, 1979)

(R. 38).

(December 1, 1969

The "sentence of Judge

Gowans" was a sentence received on May 2, 1979, also for a
Class A misdemeanor offense of Failure to Respond

to an

Signal to Stop (R. 38 and Appellant's Brief, p. 1).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-3-401 GIVES
A COURT AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHERE A
DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ADJUDGED GUILTY
OF TWO OR MORE OFFENSES.
Appellant's contention in his first point is that
a strict reading of Utah Code Ann., § 76-3-401 (1)

(1953 1 as

amended) , forbids the imposition of consecutive sentences
where both offenses are not felonies.
subsection does state that ".

.

While true, the

. a court shall determine 1 if

a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
a fuller reading of the statute reveals that a court may
consider other circumstances of the offenses in deciding
whether to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence.
A complete reading of§ 76-3-401(1)

reveals:

Subject to the limitations of
subections (2) through (5)
a court
shall determine, lf a defendant has
been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose
I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences shall
run concurrently unless the court
states, in the sentence, that they
shall run consecutively.
Emphasis added.
Thus, this subsection must be read in conjunction
with subsections (2) through (5) and hence, all phrases of
subsection (1) must be tempered with the full thrust of these
other four subsections.
Subsection 76-3-401(2) is most dispositive of this
appeal.

It reads:
A court shall consider the gravity
and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
In the present case, appellant's criminal history

and character and the circumstances of the present offense(s)
all weigh heavily
ruling.

against him and support the court's

It is particularly noteworthy that appellant was

originally charged with two felonies--Possession of a Stolen
Motor Vehicle in violation of§ 41-1-112, Utah Code Ann.,
(1953, as amended), a third degree felony, and Theft by
Receiving in violation of§ 76-6-404, Utah Code Ann.,
(1953, as amended), a second degree felony (R. 5, 7).

As

noted in the Statement of Facts, supra, a plea bargain
process resulted in appellant pleading guilty to the class
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A misdemeanor nffense of Attempted Possession of a Stolen
I1otor Vehicle (R. 8 and 21) .

Thus, this sequence of

defense maneuvers weighed heavily against appellant inasmuch
as § 76-3-401(2) allows a court to consider such extrinsic
factors in determining how a defendant is to be sentenced
(See Statement of Facts, supra).
Appellant also construes subsection (4) of
§

76-3-401 to imply that "some courts are not 'lawfully

determined' to impose a consecutive sentence."
submits that this interpretation is inaccurate.

Respondent
Subsection

(4) reads:
If a court lawfully determined to
impose consecutive sentences, the
aggregate minimum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed twelve years'
imprisonment and the aggregate maximum
of all sentences imposed may not exceed
thirty years' imprisonment.
However,
this limitation does not apply if an
offense for which defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or life
imprisonment.
The intent of this subsection is that where a court has
decided, in its best view of the facts and legal issues of
the case, that a

consecutive sentence is appropriate, then

the limitations above quoted in subsection (4)

apply.

Appellant asks this Court to make a strained reading of
the subsection by suggesting that some courts are authorized
to impose consecutive sentences and others are not.
view is without merit.
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This

The recent case of State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870
(Utah, 1978), gives support to respondent's position.

In

Beck, appellant argued that the court erred in imposing
consecutive sentences by not properly following the requirements of§ 76-3-401{2).

This Court answered that claim

by ruling:
Beck relies on Title 76-3-401{2)
of the Code to urge that the court in a
consecutive sentence situation is duty
bound to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses." The Court
complied, orderinq a diaonostic report
before sentence, and although it is not
in the record, Beck did not show that
it did not indicate other than that it
led the court to consider the gravity
of the offenses and it must, therefore
be presumed that the court did what the
statute proscribed [sic]. This,
strengthened with the substantive rule
of discretion on the part of the court
to determine concurrent or consecutive
sentencing, dispels any claim of error
by defendant.
584 P.2d at 872.
Much the same circumstances are present in the
instant case.

Although the record here is also silent as

to whether the court did indeed consider the facts, history
and circumstances of the offense as required by§ 76-3-401(7.),
this Court may presume (as was done in Beck), that such
consideration was made.

Thus, respondent urges this Court

to again rule as was done in Beck, that the lower court here
may , in its discretion, impose a consecutive sentence on
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POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-14, ~rniCH
ALLOWS A COURT TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES UPON A DEFENDANT BEFORE
JUDGMENT ON EITHER, DOES NOT RESTRICT
A COURT FROH Il1POSING A CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCE I-THERE TWO OFFENSES WERE
COMMITTED TEN YEARS APART.
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. §
77-35-14 (1953), as amended, must be read so as to limit
a court's ability to impose consecutive sentences for
multiple offenses only where neither offense's judgment
has been rendered.

The statute reads:

If the defendant has been convicted
of two or more offenses, before judgment
on either, the judgment may be that the
imprisonment upon any one may commence
at the expiration of the imprisonment upon
any other of the offenses.
Respondent submits that the intent of this
statute was not to restrict the discretionary power of
courts by requiring that consecutive sentences may only
be given "before judgment on either." The statute is still
colored with discretionary language (i.e., "the judgment
may be.

" and "ir.tpr i sonmen t

.

.

. may commence") which

supports respondent's contention that judicial discretion
in· sentencing in this statute remains intact and unaffected.
Another consideration is the fact that under
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the general legal and statutory principle of in pari materia,
similar statutes must be read together for the aggregate,
cumulative effect of each to be realized.

Thus, reading

Section 76-3-401 and 77-35-14 in pari materia, the only
conclusion is that the lower court acted properly in
ruling that appellant be sentenced consecutively with the
offense he was presently serving.
The case of State v. Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d
781 (1967), is supportive of this position.

There, this

Court was faced with a claim that the doctrine of concurrent
and/or consecutive sentences had been wrongly applied.
Appellant, sentenced under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-18 (1953),
as an "habitual criminal" with the potential of serving a
life sentence, \vas given a consecutive sentence after he was
later found guilty of first degree perjury.

In construing

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-14 (1953), as amended (the same
statute at issue here), this Court ruled that "(t]his section
gives the court the right to make the sentences run consecutively instead of concurrently."

425 P.2d at 783.

It is important that in Dodge, the appellant, just
as the appellant in the instant matter, was incarcerated
in the Utah State Prison on a previous conviction when he
was sentenced to a consecutive sentence for a later offense.
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Yet, this court specifically ruled that

§

77-35-14

was no bar to a trial court's determination that a
defendant may properly be given a consecutive sentence
after a previous

sentence has been pronounced.

Finally, it is respondent's view that common
sense, public policy considerations of this case show that
Judge Dee's sentencing decision was proper.

The strong fact

against appellant in this case, his past criminal
history, the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
and the appellant's character and rehabilitative possibilities all support the imposed consecutive sentence.
Respondent submits that, under all these considered
circumstances, appellant's consecutive sentence is
appropriate and commensurate with the offense(s)
committed.

In fact, the imposition of a concurrent

sentence here woulu not have been in the best interests
of the State of Utah since appellant would have only
been required to serve six months (May 23, 1979 to
November 30, 1979) as opposed to eleven

months for

the Class A misdemeanor offense, to which appellant
pleaded guilty.
The lower court's ruling also preserves the
discretionary power of the judiciary in this area of
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defendant sentencing.

Respondent, therefore, urges this

court to reject appellant's second argument, as well, as being
without merit.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-401 and 77-35-14 (1953,
as amended), provide courts with the power to sentence
a defendant convicted of multiple offenses to concurrent
or consecutive sentences.

This power is evident from

the statutes, per se, and further supported by Utah case
law.

Respondent suggests that a careful review by this

Court of the facts of this case"and the statutes and case
law authorities will result in the unavoidable conclusion
that appellant was properly sentenced by Judge Dee.
Respondent asserts that this ruling of the
lower court was proper and prays the verdict and sentence
be affimed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOH
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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